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This paper is part of a research project on the effects of environmental policies on the
international competitiveness. It discusses the so-called Porter Hypothesis which
states that a comparably stricter environmental policy may lead to an increase in
competitiveness. This paper constitutes a chapter of an intended monograph and
covers the contribution of the theory of strategic environmental policies to this
discussion. Other chapters on intersectoral effects in a general equilibrium framework
and on a dynamic approach can be found in the Kiel Working Papers No. 857 and
859, respectively. We gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Fritz Thyssen
Foundation.1 Introduction
Scholz (1998) has demonstrated the intersectoral effects of unilateral environmental
policies on the global scale of national economies. This paper will deal with the effects
in a partial equilibrium framework. This partial equilibrium framework focuses on a
specific sector and assumes that the general equilibrium effects of an environmental
policy which affects this sector can be ignored. This assumption is made to be able to
measure the welfare effects of environmental policies by changes of the producer rents
of this sector and by changes of the environmental damages. Although this assumption
is very constructive for the theoretical analysis, it raises a serious problem when the
effects on competitiveness are to be discussed: if the effects on the rest of the economy
can be ignored, the impact of environmental policies on this sector can be expected to
be negligible as well. Hence, a more thorough investigation would require to explore
the effects on the whole economy. If these effects were negligible, the effect on overall
competitiveness should be negligible as well.
Despite this obvious inconsistency, a lot of papers have considered the effect of
unilateral environmental policies on the basis of this assumption, for example Barrett
(1994), Conrad and Wang (1993), Kennedy (1994), Rauscher (1994, 1995a, 1995b),
Simpson and Bradford (1996) and Ulph (1994, 1996). The theoretical basis of these
papers is the pathbreaking paper of Brander and Spencer (1985) on strategic trade
policy. Brander and Spencer have shown that a single country has an incentive to
subsidize a domestic firm in an international oligopolistic market under certain
conditions. The reason is that, subsidization - either by direct support causing cost
reductions or by subsidization of research and development - is able to imply a
behavior of the firm as if it were a Stackelberg leader. If the effects on the consumer
rent can be ignored, it can be shown that it is profitable to pursue a policy for which
the costs of subsidization do always fall short of the increased profits of the domestic
firm. Based on this result, free trade agreements cannot be expected unless countries
are able to bind themselves not to introduce trade policy instruments.
3The discussion on strategic policies initiated by the results of Brander and Spencer was
not restricted to trade policy instruments. The reason for an extension to other policy
instruments is twofold. First, the use of trade policy instruments has been subject to
severe restrictions by international trade agreements. Hence, their application is
restricted although not excluded. Second, trade policy instruments are not the only
option for pursuing strategic policies. The question was raised whether the design of
other regulatory instruments could be affected by strategic considerations as well.
Since environmental problems which are due to the public good property of an
environmental asset require policy intervention, it is obviously a necessary exercise to
investigate whether environmental policy may serve for other purposes in addition to
increasing environmental net benefits. Hence, the issue of competitiveness can be
covered by strategic policy models since the Porter Hypothesis claims such additional
benefits of strict environmental policies. This paper will therefore discuss the impact
of strict unilateral environmental policies on the competitiveness from this viewpoint
of strategic policies. Since our attention is restricted to environmental regulation, we
will refer to this policy as strategic environmental policy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will give a rather informal overview of
the main results of strategic environmental policies. Section 3 will show why strategic
aspects are so important. Sections 4 and 5 will explore the incentives for policy makers
in more detail. Readers who are not interested in the mathematical exposition of this
theory may skip over Sections 4 and 5. Section 4 will discuss a two-stage model;
Section 5 will discuss a three-stage model which includes research and development or
the specification of environmental quality. Section 6 will discuss how changing some
crucial assumptions will alter the main results of the theory of strategic environmental
policies. Section 7 will conclude.2 Strategic environmental policies and competitiveness: the basic results
In order to capture the idea and to explain the main results of strategic environmental
policy models, it is helpful to start with the basic assumptions. Strategic environmental
policy models assume imperfect markets. A certain market will be served by a limited
number of firms which are located in different countries. In order to simplify the
analysis, it is helpful (and done in many papers) to assume two countries and two
firms, one in each country. The assumed market structure is not endogenous such that
firms enter the market as long as profits are positive and no further firm enters when
profits are equal to zero (and the number of firms in the market is finite due to fixed
costs). Instead, it is assumed that the market structure is given, for example because
market entry of other firms is not possible.
Since only two firms are operating in a certain market, the behavior of one firm will
have an impact not only on this firm's profits but on the profits of the other firm as
well. For example, a firm which decreases its price in order to increase sales will
obviously also imply decreased sales and decreased profits of the other firm. The
profits and the change of profits implied by strategic environmental policies are at the
heart of the analysis of strategic environmental policies. In order to arrive at clear-cut
results, it is also assumed that effects on consumers can be ignored. This assumption is
often justified by the consideration that both firms may produce for a market in a third
country such that domestic consumers are not affected. Under this assumption, the
welfare of a country is defined only by the profits of the domestic industry under
consideration and the environmental damage caused by the industry.
The logic of strategic environmental policies can be demonstrated by considering
policies which are not yet strategic. Non-strategic environmental policies reduce
pollution such that the marginal profit decrease due to environmental regulation is
equal to the marginal damage caused by pollution. Suppose that both countries pursue
such an environmental policy. Taking this policy as a starting-point, one may then
discuss whether a unilateral policy change in either the direction of more or of less
5regulation will benefit the country in terms of welfare. Hence, this paper will discuss
strategic aspects of environmental policies by considering the strategic incentive for a
policy which has not yet recognized strategic interactions^
The idea of strategic policies can be made clear by a simple example. Suppose that
every firm has three options from which it may choose its market policy: option I
mirrors a strategy which aims to realize the maximum profit given that the other firm
chooses a less aggressive option, option II gives a medium aggressive strategy, and
option III stands for a strategy which realizes a low but positive profit irrespective of
the other firm's strategy. For the ease of exposition, we will assume specific numbers
for the profits to be realized under the nine possible outcomes. These outcomes are
summarized by Table 1.
Table 1: Profits under different market strategies
Firm 1 chooses rows
















The profits under all possible outcomes are given in parenthesis as (profit of firm 1,
profit of firm 2). According to Table 1, the game is symmetric since a certain strategy
pair turned around gives the original profits turned around as well. Table 1 mirrors the
so-called strategic form of the market game since it summarizes the different outcomes
but does not contain any information about the move structure, i.e. whether both firms
are supposed to decide on their strategies simultaneously or whether a certain firm may
decide first on its policy without any option for revision. The strategic form allows to
determine all Nash equilibria, i.e. all outcomes which meet the condition that no firm
can improve its profits by choosing a different strategy, given the strategy of itsopponent. From Table 1, one finds that three Nash equilibria exist: (I,IH), (U,II) and
(III.I) which give profits of (80,10), (60,60) and (10,80), respectively.
The disadvantage of the presentation by the strategic form is that not all possible
equilibria are credible under all possible mover structures. Suppose that firm 1 has to
move first, and that after firm l's move it is up to firm 2 to decide on its market
strategy. Obviously, firm 1 realizes the highest profit if it chooses strategy I whereas
firm 2 chooses strategy III. Hence, if firm 1 goes ahead, it will choose I because firm 2
cannot do better by another strategy than III given I by firm 1. In this case, firm 1 has a
first-mover advantage since it is able to realize the Nash equilibrium which gives it the
highest profits. It is not credible that firm 2 chooses II or I since it would be worse off.
If the move structure is turned around such that firm 2 moves first and firm 1 is to
follow, the results are also turned around and only (III,I) giving (10,80) can qualify for
a credible equilibrium. If both firms move simultaneously without being able to
observe the behavior of the opponent, the traditional analysis of industrial markets
implies the symmetric equilibrium (II,II) giving profits (60,60). Since a certain mover
structure cannot be assumed without assuming an institutional arrangement which
implies the mover structure, one may expect that (11,11) is the relevant equilibrium.
Strategic aspects may now enter the stage. At the heart of the strategic policy analysis
is the question whether a unilateral policy change may imply that the relevant industry
equilibrium changes such that social welfare is increased. Social welfare can be
increased if the domestic firm is induced to behave as if it were in a leading position
although it is not in fact. This behavior can be implied by changing the profits
properly. Suppose that option I is a very "dirty" option because the high profits of I go
along with excessive resource use due to a high production level. Hence,
environmental regulation which does not take strategic aspects into account is stricter
if a firm chooses I instead of II or III. Now suppose that country I relaxes
environmental regulation such that it is not so strict if firm 1 chooses I. Assume thatthe profits are increased by 15 by a lax regulation for I, whereas the damage is
increased by 20. Table 2 gives the revised payoffs.
Table 2: The influence of strategic subsidies on profits
Firm 1 chooses rows
















One may call such a policy strategic subsidization because a firm choosing option I
does no longer take all environmental costs into account since regulation is too lax. As
the increase in profits for I is 15 but the increase in damage is 20, one might find at
first glance that this policy makes the country worse off. But the opposite is true since
I was not the relevant equilibrium before but it is now. According to Table 2, the only
equilibrium is (I,III) now because firm 1 will choose I in every case because strategy I
gives the highest profits irrespective of the strategy of firm 2 when these subsidies are
granted. Since the profits are increased by 35 (from 60 to 95) and the damage is
increased by 20, social welfare is increased by 15. Hence, the lax environmental policy
is able to increase social welfare.
This example demonstrates that a too lax environmental policy might increase social
welfare and the profits of an industry. In this case, however, the profit increase goes
along with more pollution. Hence, strategic policies do not necessarily imply less
environmental damages since this example shows that unilateral ecological dumping
may improve a country's welfare. Nevertheless, another example may show that
strategic policies may also imply stricter environmental regulation as it is claimed by
the Porter Hypothesis. Suppose now that not strategy I but strategies II and III are the
"dirty" options. Assume that country 1 introduces a stricter environmental regulationfor these options which decrease the profits of both options by 15 and the damage by
10. Table 3 gives the revised payoffs.
Table 3: The influence of strategic taxes on profits
Firm 1 chooses rows
















In this case, strategic policies may be called strategic taxation since the domestic firm
has to bear a regulatory burden if it chooses II or III which is larger than optimal. But
this bias brings the domestic firm also in a leadership position as strategic subsidies
did. The effect is identical since removing 15 units of profits from II and III implies the
same incentive as adding 15 units of profits to I. Again, firm 1 will choose strategy I
now irrespective of the choice of firm 2, and then firm 2 cannot do better than to
choose strategy III. Since too strict regulation does not apply because I is chosen,
social welfare is increased by the same amount as the profits of the domestic firm, i.e.
20 units. In this case, profits are increased and the environmental damage remains
constant.
Both examples show that there is no unambiguous effect of a stricter environmental
policy on profits and welfare. In the general models of the subsequent sections, it will
be shown that the incentive to regulate either stricter or laxer compared to the
Pigouvian solution depends only on the changes of the strategic variables of the other
firm. Hence, strategic environmental policy is in fact industrial policy which intends to
influence the behavior of foreign competitors in a way which benefits the domestic
industry.In the literature, two different types of strategic environmental policies are discussed,
and this result holds for both types. In a two-stage version, firms decide on their
strategic variables after governments have specified environmental regulation. In this
case, it is not possible that profits are increased and environmental damage is
decreased. Instead, either profit is increased for the cost of more damage or damage is
decreased for the cost of less profit. Hence, the Porter Hypothesis can never hold in the
two-stage version of strategic environmental policies. The reason is that research and
development or the specification of environmental quality which is appreciated by
consumers plays no role in this setting.
If research and development or environmental policy (both are referred to as R&D in
the subsequent sections) should play a role, strategic environmental policy models
comprise three stages. The first and the third stage are identical with the first and the
second stage of the two-stage version, respectively. Before firms determine their
market strategy, however, they are assumed to determine the level of research and
development or the environmental quality of their products. In the case of research and
development, each firm is able to increase the environmental and/or production
efficiency by research and development. In the case of environmental quality to be
specified, each firm may make a certain product "greener" such that consumers are
willing to pay a higher price for them compared to a product which is less green. In
these settings, it is possible that a unilateral increase in environmental regulation
increases the profits of the domestic firm and decreases the environmental damage.
The analysis of these cases is very involved but an example can make the possible
effects clear. Assume that research and development is able to decrease environmental
compliance costs. The effects of a stricter environmental regulation are shown in
Figure 1.




















The effect of a stricter environmental regulation is threefold. The first arrow gives the
direct cost effect of stricter environmental regulation which obviously increases the
costs of the firm. The other two arrows give the indirect effects: on the one hand,
higher costs will imply lower production, and lower production lowers the productivity
of research and development. On the other hand, additional research and development
is able to compensate for higher costs. This effect increases research and development.
Since the first two effects and die third effect are opposite in sign, the total effect is
ambiguous. Hence, it is possible that the last cost-decreasing effect is stronger than the
other two effects such that costs are decreased. If the costs of research and
development are not too high and the odier firm decreases its research and
development in response (thereby implying higher costs), it might turn out that even
profits are increased. In this case, stricter environmental regulation leads to more
research and development and higher profits of the domestic firm.
However, the cases in which stricter environmental regulation leads to increased
profits are rather artificial, and there is no general theoretic evidence that the Porter
Hypothesis holds in this setting. Additionally, all these approaches assume that the
other country does not change its environmental policy which does not yet take into
account strategic aspects. But this is not an optimal strategy. Instead, the incentive for
the other country will be identical in the case of symmetric countries and symmetric
11firms. If both countries pursue a certain policy which takes into account the strategic
effects, they enter a prisoners' dilemma situation: every country is worse off compared
to no strategic policies but - as it was shown - each country increases its welfare if it
introduces strategic policies when the other country does not. An example can make
this point clear. Consider Table 2 which discussed unilateral subsidization. If both
countries subsidize, the payoffs are given by Table 4.
Table 4: The influence of bilateral strategic subsidies on profits
Firm 1 chooses rows
















Due to bilateral subsidization, the equilibrium strategy pair is now (1,1) which defines
the dirtiest option. The profits of each firm are decreased by 45 (from 60 to 15) and the
damage is increased by 20 by assumption. Hence, bilateral subsidization incurs losses
for each country of 65! Note that these losses will in fact be realized because a
unilateral abolishment of strategic policies would lead to Table 2 such that it would not
be followed by an abolishment of the other country.
The result that strategic policies lead to prisoners' dilemma situations is common to all
models. Therefore, the Porter Hypothesis is hard to justify in this setting unless there
are good reasons to assume that one country behaves strategically but the other country
does not. One may conclude that another framework is necessary in order to be able to
arrive at more optimistic results for the impact of strict environmental policies on
competitiveness. Stahler (1998) will be an attempt and will discuss the Porter
Hypothesis in a similar strategic framework which is extended to several periods.
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3 Environmental policies and technology choice
Before turning to strategic environmental policy models in detail, it is helpful to
demonstrate why strategic aspects are so important. This exercise will be done by a
rather general approach in this section. This section will show that increased
environmental regulation is not able to increase the profits of a firm when strategic
effects are absent. It will employ a microeconomic model which was used by Oates,
Palmer and Portney (1993). This framework analyzes the effect of environmental
regulation in a microeconomic partial equilibrium framework of technology choice. In
this section improvements in competitiveness is understood as a reduction of costs. A
single firm is assumed which currently employs a technology that leads to emissions
P$ for which it is charged an emission tax wpQ. The firm has the possibility to switch
technology at date T, such that emissions are only fj. Switching, however, is costly
and cannot be done unless a sunk investment cost, /, is incurred. The firm minimizes
the present value of its future cost through the choice of its switching date T.
Therefore, the cost minimization problem can be stated as:
(1) C(wP) = min = j wpPoe~"dt + j°°wPPle~
rtdt+ Ie~
rT.
The solution to this simple problem is the following comer solution.
> fO
(2) wPP0 wPPl+rI=>T =
If the current cost of technology 0 is larger than the sum of the current cost of
technology 1 plus the annuity value of the sunk switching cost, the switching date is
zero. Otherwise the switching date is infinity. If the switching date is zero, technology
0 is immediately abandoned for technology 1, otherwise technology 1 is never chosen.
Environmental regulation is equivalent to raising the emission tax from WPQ to wPv
Before the tightening of the environmental regulation the firm chooses the dirty
technology 0. Therefore, we must have for wPo <wP^:
13wPoPo < WPQPX + rl,
such that the clean technology is never chosen. If the increase in the environmental
regulation is strong enough, such that the clean technology is chosen the new
equilibrium must be:
+ rl.
One interpretation of the Porter Hypothesis is that in the new equilibrium it is possible
that costs are lower than in the initial equilibrium. In other words, C(wPo)> C(wPl).
Integrating (1) and considering the necessary condition (2), the Porter Hypothesis can
be stated as:
(3) wPoPo > wPlPi +rl.
Since wp0 < wpv wpx can be expressed as wp0 +a, where a > 0. In this case (3) can
be rewritten as:
WPOPQ >WPQP\ +rI + aPx.
If this inequality is fulfilled also wPoPo > wp0P[ + rl is fulfilled. However, in this case
it would have not been optimal for the firm to choose technology 0 in the initial
equilibrium. Thus, in this simple framework the Porter Hypothesis cannot be true if the
firms are always minimizing their costs. In other words, in this simple model
environmental policy always increases costs. Environmental policy cannot yield an
international competitive advantage, but only a disadvantage, since the costs of firms,
subject to the increase in environmental regulation, will experience an increase in
costs.
Now, one can ask which effects have to be introduced in this simple model such that
this result changes and the Porter Hypothesis can become true. General equilibrium
effects might play an important role. For example environmental regulation might lead
to a reallocation of resources. Therefore, factor prices change and some sectors of the
14economy might be overcompensated for the increase in environmental regulation.
Scholz (1998) has dealt explicitly with these effects. Another possible effect that might
play an important role is strategic interaction or the possibility to accumulate
knowledge which can be sold to other firms or lead to a comparative advantage. This
possibility will be investigated in the next two sections. This section, however, has
shown that the Porter Hypothesis can never hold in a partial equilibrium setting when
there are no strategic interactions among firms.
4 A general approach to strategic environmental policies and competitiveness
I: The two-stage game
This section will show that strategic environmental policy is in fact industrial policy. It
will show that environmental policy serves merely as a tool for influencing the
behavior of the foreign industry such that the profits of the domestic industry increase
more than the costs of this policy or such that the profits of this industry decrease less
than the benefits of this policy. Compared to strategic trade theory, the welfare effects
do imply not only changes of the producer rent but also of the environmental net
benefits.
One may distinguish between two different approaches to strategic environmental
policies. The first case deals with a two-stage approach. In these models, two stages
constitute a game such that when the first stage is specified, there is no option to
change the results of the first stage in the second stage. This assumption makes it
possible to solve the game in the usual backward induction fashion, i.e. to solve the
second stage first for a given result of the first stage, and then to use these results of
the second stage in order to determine the results in the first stage. The strict mover
structure makes only this solution subgame-perfect. All other different Nash equilibria
involve an incredible threat. Table 1 shows the structure of the two-stage game.







Firms specify their market
strategy.
In the two-stage game, the government specifies environmental regulation first which
is given (and cannot be changed) for the firms which decide on their market policy in
the second stage. When firms have determined their market policy, the game is
finished.
Let the profit functions of each firm be denoted by IT:
(4) nJspS^a,], n^SpS^aJ
(4) gives the profit of each firm as a function of the strategy levels of this firm and of
the other firm, oq denotes the policy parameter of country 1 which will be changed
marginally in order to determine the marginal welfare effects. a\ may represent an
emission tax, a minimum environmental quality of the produced good or any other
environmental regulation. In the two-stage game, however, we will restrict our
attention to policy measures like taxes because the strategy level is assumed to be a
scalar (and therefore cannot comprise quality decisions as well). Each firm has only its
strategy level under control but has no influence on the other firm's strategy level. The
strategy spaces of each firm may either consist of prices which the firm may charge for
its product or of non-negative quantities which determine the capacity which will be
produced. (4) does not consider (X2 since only variations of a\ will be discussed.
16Instead of solving the general game, the strategic incentives can be made clear by
considering marginal changes of the market equilibrium. Suppose that environmental
regulation in both countries leads to Pigouvian intemalization of externalities:
(5)
dWj ar^ dP;
The social welfare, W, of each country is determined by the profits of the domestic
firm, FT, minus the environmental damage caused by pollution, P. (5) assumes that
environmental damage depends on the degree of environmental regulation. This
specification might look strange because one might expect that damages depend on
emissions, for example. But in order to be able to be very general, (5) assumes that
increased regulation leads to less pollution because, for example, emissions are
reduced. Then, the environmental damage can be made dependent on the level of
environmental policies.
Additionally, it is assumed that externalities do not imply a transboundary pollution
problem which is likely to imply a strategic environmental policy problem between
both countries. This assumption implies that (5) is a first-best environmental policy. If
instead transboundary pollution were assumed, (5) would give an inefficient outcome
since the effect on the other country would not be taken into account. Then, Pj(ai,ot2)
substitutes for Pj(cq) and the cooperative Pigouvian solution would imply
da{ fdcc,
 U"
Since this analysis focuses on the effects of environmental policies on profits,
transboundary pollution will not be assumed. However, it should be clear that a stricter
(laxer) environmental policy of a country increases (decreases) the welfare of the other
country through reduced (increased) transboundary pollution. One may then conclude
that a bilateral incentive for stricter (laxer) environmental policy compensates
17(pronounces) the welfare losses which are due to uncoordinated international
environmental policies.
As in Section 2, two firms in two different countries are assumed. Each firm is
assumed to maximize its current profits. Maximization of (4) determines the reaction
functions s'j(s2) and s^Csj) which can be given as implicit functions fi and f2:




The reaction functions give the optimal strategy level of a firm for a given strategy
level of the other firm. Duopolists compete by strategic substitutes (complements) if
each firm's best reaction to an increase of the other firm's strategy variable is to
decrease (increase) its own strategy variable (Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer,
1985). The slope of the reaction curve is
which is negative (positive) for strategic substitutes (complements). Since the second
derivative with respect to the own strategy level must be negative along the reaction
curve in order to guarantee a global profit maximum, the cross derivative determines
the slope of the reaction curve. Markets for strategic substitutes are markets in which
firms set quantities, markets for strategic complements are markets in which firms
compete by prices. Hence, the vector of both firms' strategies is constrained by the
condition that a maximum quantity exists for which demand is saturated (strategic
substitutes) or by the condition that a maximum willingness to pay exists by which
demand is choked off (strategic complements). The following condition guarantees that





18Condition (8) guarantees that the effects of the own strategy level on own profits is
stronger than the effect of the other firm's strategy level. Since this condition is
assumed to hold in general (and not only at a certain point), it guarantees also that the
equilibrium is unique. In order to determine the marginal welfare changes, it is
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2 3s23a,
The response of firm 2's strategy to a change of the policy parameter can be computed












with p:= . 2
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2 --, -,' -,
2 >Q
3s, 3s2 3s,3s2 3S]ds2
P is positive due to (8). Since it is assumed that the strategy levels of.both firms are
scalars and hence the policy intervention is a tax or a similar measure, we may exclude
any direct effect of the policy measure on firm 2's profits except those which are due to
firm 2's reaction. If there is no direct effect of regulation in country 1 on profits of firm
2, (11) which defines individual profits and its change with the policy parameter holds.
(ID n2 = p2()x2()-c2[x2()]
^fk = (A= 3^*11 = o, Vs2. dax 3s23oc1 3x23a! 3s2
 2
(11) defines the profits as the difference between individual demand p2()x2() for
firm 2 and the individual costs of firm 2. Individual demand is the product of the
19realized price p2 and the realized quantity X2- In the case of strategic substitutes, firms
compete by specifying quantities so that SJ = XJ and dxj = dsj. In this case, the
individual price is a function of both firms' strategies but the quantities themselves are
no function of further strategic variables. In the case of strategic complements, firms
compete by specifying prices so that SJ = pj. Then, there is an inverse relationship
between strategy variable and individual output so that dxj/dsj is negative. In that case,
the individual quantity is a function of both firms' strategies but the prices themselves
are no function of further strategic variables. (11) specifies that the policy parameter
has no direct influence on the profits of firm 2. Note that a similar relationship does
not hold for firm 1 since the marginal profits are only zero for strategy levels on the
reaction curve.
Under this assumption, the impact of a policy change on the strategic variable of firm 2
is unambiguous for the cases under consideration:
da, P 3sj3s2 ds,3a ,3a,
(12) can be proved by considering the case of strategic complements and the case of
strategic substitutes. For strategic complements, (13) holds:
(13) Si =Pi,n, =PiX1(p1,p2)-C1[x1(p,,p2),a1]
In the case of strategic complements, the strategy variable is the price charged by a
firm. (13) gives the definition of profits, the definition of strategic complements, and
derives the second derivative of the profit function with respect to the strategy variable
and the policy parameter. d^Ci/B\\dai describes how marginal costs are increased by
stricter regulation and is therefore positive. The derivation of the firm's demand
function with respect to its own price is obviously negative. These properties lead to a
positive sign of ds2/doq, stating that the foreign firm will increase its price as a
20reaction to a stricter environmental regulation of the domestic firm. In the case of
strategic substitutes, the strategy variable is the production of a firm:




(14) gives the definition of profits, the definition of strategic substitutes, and the
second derivative of the profit function with respect to the strategic variable and the
policy parameter. The properties imply a positive sign of ds2/dcq as well. One may
wonder whether it is not also necessary to consider dsi/doq. But as it can be seen
soon, dsj/doq does not play any role for determining the incentive for strategic
environmental policies. Under the use of (6), the change of profits of firm 1 is given by
dnIanLds^anL
d
(15) uses the property that firm 1 maximizes its profits in the second stage so that
dl~li/dsi = 0. Obviously, one may expect a negative direct effect of stricter regulation
on profits so that dU\/da\ is negative. Due to (12), the sign of the first term is equal to
the sign of dFIi/ds2, i.e. the impact of a change of the foreign firm's strategy variable
on the domestic firm's profits. In the case of price competition (strategic complements),
dFIi/ds2 is positive since an increase in the competitor's price increases own profits. In
the case of quantity competition (strategic substitutes), dnj/ds2 is negative since an
increase in the competitor's production decreases own profits. From (15), it can
therefore be seen that a stricter (laxer) regulation increases (decreases) the domestic
firm's profits in the case of strategic substitutes. In the case of strategic complements,
the two effects are opposite: a stricter (laxer) environmental regulation decreases
(increases) profits directly (second term) but increases (decreases) profits indirectly
through the strategic effect (first term).
Due to (5), the change of welfare is
21(16) ^p.= ""i -2
da, ds2 da!
From (16), it can be seen directly that the marginal welfare effect of a stricter
environmental regulation depends only on the type of competition and the reaction of
the opponent. In the case of strategic complements, a country has an incentive to
impose stricter environmental regulation on the domestic firm since the decrease in
profits is overcompensated by the decrease in environmental damage. In the case of
strategic substitutes, a country has an incentive to relax environmental regulation. A
similar result for strategic trade policies was found by Eaton and Grossman (1986).
(15) and (16) use the envelope theorem because around the non-cooperative
equilibrium only effects of other strategy level change and the policy change but no
own strategy effect matters since marginal profits are zero. (16) is the central result of
strategic policies in two-stage games. It demonstrates that the Porter Hypothesis can
never hold in this type of games because either both the profits and the environmental
damage are increased or both are decreased. Hence, this section finds that other
strategic variables must also enter the stage to make the Porter Hypothesis possible.
Section 5 will introduce another strategy option of firms.
5 A general approach to strategic environmental policies and competitiveness
II: The three-stage game
Since the Porter Hypothesis emphasizes the role of innovations, a straightforward
extension of the model of the previous section is to consider the role that research and
development or the specification of environmental quality (both will be referred to as
R&D) could play. R&D is included in models of strategic environmental policies by an
additional stage: after the governments have specified environmental regulation, firms
decide on R&D which either affects their production and/or environmental compliance
22costs or determines the environmental quality of their product. After that decision, the
firms specify their market strategy. Table 2 shows the structure of three-stage models.









and development or the
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Firms specify their market
strategies.
In this setting, four strategic variables may influence the profits of each firm: the
market strategies and the R&D levels. In general, the profit function is therefore given
by
(17) ni(s,,s2,r1,r2,a1).
Due to the strict specification of moves, however, one may solve the game in the usual
backward induction fashion. When environmental regulation and R&D have been
specified, the firms maximize their profits by setting the first derivative of their profit
function with respect to their market strategy variable equal to zero:
g\ and g2 denote the reaction function of this stage. Assuming that gj and g2 lead to a
unique equilibrium at this stage irrespective of R&D and environmental regulation, one
may write the equilibrium market strategies of the third stage as functions of R&D and
environmental regulation in country 1:
23(19) sJ(r,,r2,<Xj).
The star denotes the equilibrium market strategy. By means of (19), one can define
indirect profit functions in which the market strategies are replaced by the equilibrium
strategies as determined by (18):
(20) n^^aJ^n^sKr^^a^s^rp^aiXr!,^^],
These indirect profit functions allow the behavior in the second stage to be determined.
Before turning to this behavior, one may consider how the equilibrium market
strategies change with R&D. In particular, it is interesting to explore how si and S2
change with ri since this change is relevant for determining the behavior in the second
stage. Total differentiation of (18) leads to
ill) dgj^ds.+^ds^^dr^O,
The superscript i denotes either 1 or 2 because due to the standard zero conjecture
assumption only the own effects on the equilibrium market strategies will be taken into
account. From (21), one finds that the equilibrium market strategies change with R&D
according to
(22) ^ = i





(22) enters the determination of equilibrium R&D. The reaction functions with respect
to R&Dj-are denoted by hj:
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Before turning to comparative statics results, a closer inspection of the derivatives of
the indirect profit function is helpful for pronouncing the high degree of complexity
and ambiguity in three-stage games. Since the structure of the game implies
3s2
the derivatives of the indirect profit functions are
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25(25) and (29) must be negative in order to ensure that the necessary conditions for an
optimal R&D level are also sufficient. (26) and (28) are negative (positive) if R&D
levels are strategic substitutes (complements). If they are strategic substitutes
(complements), an increase in one firm's R&D level implies a decrease (increase) in
the other firm's R&D level (note that the model is still general and R&D may stand for
research and development or environmental quality). (25) to (30) demonstrate that the
derivatives in (24) are not easy to determine and that different effects are likely to
make these derivatives ambiguous in sign, if, for example, second-order changes of the
equilibrium market strategies are considered. Hence, these derivatives cannot be
interpreted such straightforwardly as it was possible for (9) in the two-stage game.
The standard comparative statics results hold if the effect of own R&D changes are
stronger than those of the other firm. This condition is fulfilled if (31) holds:
r>0




It is not necessary to determine dri/doq for similar reasons as in the previous section.
The impact of regulation on the domestic firms profits is given by (33):
(33) dn^an^s; dr2 | an, dr2 | 9n, da ds dr da 3r da da, ds2 dr2 da, 3r2 da, 3a, '
(33) makes use of two properties: first, the change of profits of firm 1 may be
simplified by the property that the first derivative with respect to the own strategy level
is zero, second, one may use (23) to substitute for the first derivative with respect to
own R&D, such that only the effect on the other firm's R&D prevail. Due to Pigouvian
regulation, i.e.
26an, =
the effect on welfare is
(34) dw, = an, as; dr2 | an, dr2 da ds dr da = |
da, ds2 dr2 da, ar2 da, '
(34) shows that the welfare effect depends only on the reaction of the foreign firm's
equilibrium market strategy to the foreign firm's R&D and the reaction of the foreign
firm's R&D to the policy variation. The first term gives the direct effect through the
strategic market interaction, the second term gives the spillover effect. From (34), one
may conclude that the incentive to introduce a certain policy does not depend on the
effects on the home country's behavior but only on the changes of the foreign firm's
behavior.
In the case of no spillovers, welfare and profit changes are
dni
 an'
 asz ^ an.
05) da, ds2 c)r2 da,' da, ds2 dv2 da, 3a,
From (35), one can see that it is possible that both profits are increased and
environmental damage is decreased. Since it is known that in the case of strategic
substitutes (complements)
holds, one finds that if
social welfare increases and profits might increase as well if the strategic effect is
stronger than the direct cost effect. The reason is that research and development or the
specification of the environmental quality introduces a good deal of ambiguity. As (25)
to (30) have shown, a lot of effects can be at work which work in opposite directions
27or are even themselves ambiguous in sign. This feature holds even for a very simple
example which will now be presented. The example can also be found in Ulph (1994).
The example assumes constant unit costs and strategic substitutes in the product
market. The environmental problem is simple: if there is no regulation, harmful
emissions are released which are equal to production. If whatever regulation is
introduced, the firm faces an additional cost to production costs. However, it is able to
decrease this part of the constant costs by R&D which is research and development in
this model. (36) gives the unit cost function of a firm:
(36) C; = c~ + ociei(ri), e-<0, e">0,
ei(0)>0, ()
Due to (36), unit costs consist of a constant term and the shadow price imposed by
regulation which can be decreased by an emission abatement technology whose costs
can be decreased by R&D. The assumption of constant unit costs is very constructive
because several second-order effects which would have to be considered under
increasing marginal costs are equal to zero. Additionally, the assumption of innovation
activities in the second stage is very helpful since it ensures that there are no R&D
effects on the demand side. The problem would be rather more complex, if one
assumed instead that firms determine environmental quality (in reaction to regulation)
which affects both costs because a higher quality implies higher R&D costs and sales
because a higher quality faces a higher willingness to pay on the consumer side.
The assumption of strategic substitutes, i.e. Sj = x;, leads to profits of
(37) Ilj =pi(x,,x2)x1 -[q+oiieiCOjxi -I-.
Profits are a function of the individual demand function pj with negative derivatives
with respect to both firms' production xi and X2, the firm's production and R&D.
Another helpful property of this model is that |3 does not depend on oq and rj. This
property simplifies the determination substantially, in particular the determination of
28the derivatives of the equilibrium market strategies. Note that this nice property does
not hold for the twin model of strategic complements. Hence, the degree of complexity
is already tremendously increased when this simple model is taken to investigate price
competition.
This simple model implies that several terms in (25) to (30) can be set equal to zero.
One finds that the equilibrium output of the opponent is increased when the opponent
increases its research and development:
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It can be shown that 3
zri2/3x23r2 is positive for this model such that an unambiguous
sign can be determined. The unambiguous sign of (38), however, cannot avoid that the
response of the opponent's research and development to a change in the policy
parameter, i.e.










(40) shows that the levels of research and development are strategic substitutes in this
model since an increase in one firm's R&D makes the other firm decrease its R&D. On
the other hand, the sign of (39) is determined by (41) which is ambiguous in sign:
3
2n, 3x,» | an, a
2x2 | 3
2n,
3xj3a! dvx 3x2 d^da, dvxdax
It can be shown that the second product and the third term are positive in sign and that
the first product is negative in sign. The reason for the ambiguity is that different
effects are at work as it was shown in Figure 1. The direct effect of stricter regulation
29increases the costs of the domestic firm, and since the productivity of R&D is
decreased because output is decreased, an additional indirect effects increases costs
further. Although these two effects increase the costs as a reaction to stricter
regulation, the third effect decreases costs. This effect decreases costs because an
increase in R&D decreases the regulatory burden. If this effect is dominant, costs are
decreased and profits can be increased if the cost reduction effect is stronger than the
direct cost effect caused by additional R&D. From (35), one may find that dWi/dcq is
positive and dPIi/doii might be positive as well, if dr2/dcq is negative. But the
example demonstrates that even in a very specific model the effects are rather
ambiguous such that a general validity of the Porter Hypothesis can not be concluded.
This result is pronounced by the fact that the twin model of price competition leads to
ambiguity already at a very early stage of the model as it was mentioned above.
5 Environmental policies, free market entry and the location of industries
The beneficial effect of strategic environmental policies was not only due to the
assumption that the other country does not react. Additionally, the assumption of no
market entry and the assumption of no relocation of a firm was decisive for the result.
This section will discuss informally the effects of relaxing these assumption.
If market entry were free, the market equilibrium would be determined by the
condition that an additional firm entering would suffer losses. If firms have to carry
fixed costs in order to be able to enter the market, the market structure is oligopolistic
since the market is able to carry the fixed costs only of a certain number of firms. In
this case, strategic policies are no longer able to alter the profits of a domestic industry
since profits are always equal to zero in equilibrium. Under free market entry, strategic
effects vanish and any environmental policy would be determined only by the effects
of industry production on pollution.
30If firms were able to move to those countries with a lax environmental regulation, one
might believe that a polluting industry should be concentrated in those countries
imposing the laxest environmental regulation. This assumption might become true;
however, there are certain effects which may prevent this extreme outcome. First,
firms have to invest when building up a new production site. When considering to
move, they take these set up costs into account. These costs are in most cases sunk for
the current location such that they compare the benefits of moving minus the set up
costs with the benefits of staying in the home country. Only if the benefits of moving
are very high compared to no relocation, a firm can be expected to move. If the
differences are small, a firm will not move because the lax environmental regulation
would not compensate for the set up costs.
Second, environmental regulation patterns are not always specified in a way that they
treat every firm alike independent of the number of polluting firms. Consider for
example a certain quality standard for ambient air which is polluted by emissions
released by the firms of a certain industry. Suppose that the foreign country has
introduced a lower quality standard than the home country, and that the number of
firms in the foreign country is equal to the number of firms in the home country in the
beginning. If a certain number of firms moves to the foreign countries, two effects can
be observed: first, it will become harder for all firms in the foreign country to meet the
quality standard. Thus, the benefits of moving are reduced by movement; and if the
firms moving have to carry overproportional efforts to meet the standards compared to
foreign firms in the foreign country, these benefits are even more strongly reduced by
movement. Second, the remaining firms can meet the stricter domestic standard more
easily which makes movement less profitable. From both effects, it is easy to see that
not all firms can be expected to move, and that cases are possible in which even no
firm moves despite the stricter regulation. If the market is not open for market entry
and regulation is not to different in order to imply relocation of plants, the effects of
the last section may be also observed.
316 Conclusions
This paper has shown that strategic environmental policy is in fact industrial policy.
The incentive to regulate stricter or laxer depends on the type of competition and the
multiple effects of research and development or environmental quality specification. In
the simple model, the Porter Hypothesis can never hold because either profits and
damages are increased or both are decreased. It is possible to increase profits and to
decrease damage in extended models but this result relies on rather artificial
assumptions. In general, the effect is ambiguous, and the incentive of strategic policies
depends only on the reaction of the opponent to a changed domestic regulation.
Furthermore, it is well known that all these effects do only hold if the foreign country
does not react. If it reacts, both countries will be in a prisoners' dilemma situation and
hence worse off compared to Pigouvian environmental policies. Therefore, any
strategic policy can be successful only if there are good reasons to assume that the
other country will not react. If it does, the result will be worse and the Porter
Hypothesis cannot hold even under the artificial assumptions to be made for unilateral
strategic policies. Since strategic policies are in fact industrial polices and the effect on
the consumer side was ignored, the best cooperative policy for both countries would be
to promote merger of both firms. Since merger implied monopolization, joint profits
would be maximized. This result shows that the results of this paper are valid only if
consumer effects can be ignored. If they cannot be ignored, the incentives can be
different because significant consumer rent effects can initiate a policy which intends
to increase the production levels. Hence, considering consumer effects will further
increase the degree of ambiguity in strategic environmental policy models.
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